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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
(Authority) appeals the District Court‘s summary judgment, 
which orders the Authority to make modifications to its 
Grove Street Station to bring it into compliance with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-336, 104 Stat. 378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101–12213).  We will vacate this judgment and remand 
the case for further proceedings.  In a cross-appeal, Plaintiffs 
Heightened Independence and Progress, Inc. (hip), the United 
Spinal Association, and Peter Gimbel appeal the District 
Court‘s order dismissing their state-law claims on the basis 
that allowing such claims to proceed would violate the 
interstate compact between New York and New Jersey that 
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created the Authority.  That order of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
I 
A 
 The Authority‘s wholly owned subsidiary, the Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH), operates the 
Grove Street Station in Jersey City, New Jersey, which is the 
subject of this lawsuit.  The Station has three levels—street, 
mezzanine, and platform—and two street-level entrance 
sides—east and west.  The Station can serve an eight-car 
train.  The mezzanine is not connected between the east and 
west sides.  One staircase connects the east mezzanine to a 
platform-level corridor, which leads out to the platform itself. 
 The Station was built in 1910, and in the 1970s PATH 
closed the east entrance and constructed two entrances on the 
west side.  As reflected in a 2001 report, in 2000 PATH 
planned to expand the Station to accommodate ten-car trains 
and persons with disabilities, a project that would have 
involved the construction of a new entrance and two elevators 
on the west side.  After September 11, 2001, and the resulting 
closure of two of the Authority‘s stations—Exchange Place in 
New Jersey and World Trade Center in Manhattan—ridership 
increased at the Grove Street Station.  Citing concerns about 
congestion and safety, PATH scrapped its renovation plans 
and undertook a different ―fast track‖ project to reopen the 
east entrance. 
 Construction began in 2002 and concluded in 2005.  
The project involved building a new street-level pavilion and 
focused on renovating the connections between the street and 
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mezzanine levels on the east side only.  The pavilion was 
built four inches above the sidewalk to comply with flood-
plain construction requirements, and stairs were installed to 
connect the sidewalk and the building, which is also referred 
to as a ―headhouse.‖  The mezzanine was expanded to include 
a new fare-collection area.  In addition, the platform corridor 
was reopened and the interior spaces connecting the three 
levels were rehabilitated.  To complete the project, PATH 
purchased land adjacent to the Station from a private 
company. 
 In 2006, after PATH had finished construction, its 
engineering department concluded that elevator installation 
was feasible only on the west side of the Station.  PATH 
believed that the east-side platform would be too crowded 
with an elevator, leading to safety concerns, and that 
construction on the east side would result in service 
disruption and possible flooding. 
B 
 Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in state court in 2007, and 
the Authority removed the case to the District Court.  The 
complaint alleges that the Grove Street Station renovations 
triggered an obligation under the ADA to make the Station 
accessible to handicapped persons.  It also alleges violations 
under New Jersey‘s Law Against Discrimination and certain 
New Jersey construction code provisions.  The District Court 
dismissed the state-law claims, reasoning that, under the 
terms of the interstate compact that created the Authority, one 
state cannot unilaterally regulate the joint entity.  See hip, Inc. 
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (hip I), No. 07-2982, 2008 WL 
852445, at *4–6 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008).  Following further 
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proceedings and failed settlement attempts, the parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment. 
 The District Court entered summary judgment for 
Plaintiffs.  During discovery, five schemes for making the 
east entrance ADA-compliant were produced, and the 
Authority‘s engineering department evaluated each of those 
schemes.  The Court held that of the five, two—Schemes 4 
and 5, which propose installation of a mezzanine-to-platform 
Limited Use Limited Access (LULA) elevator—are feasible.  
Consequently, the Court ordered the Authority to make the 
east entrance accessible.  hip, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. 
(hip II), No. 07-2982, 2011 WL 3957532, at *3–5 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 6, 2011).  The parties timely filed notices of appeal. 
II 
 The ADA is a complex law codified in numerous 
statutes in the United States Code.  Regulations have been 
promulgated by the Department of Transportation to 
implement those statutes.  And pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12204, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers 
Compliance Board has issued a set of ADA Accessibility 
Guidelines (ADAAG).  The Department of Justice produces 
an ADA ―technical assistance manual,‖ which provides still 
further guidance.  The litigants here dispute the interpretation 
of several of these provisions as applied to the Grove Street 
Station construction project. 
 For example, and as a preliminary matter, the 
regulations and the ADAAG impose different obligations on 
different kinds of construction projects.  ―New facility‖ 
construction is distinguished from the ―alteration‖ of existing 
facilities.  See 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.41, 37.43; ADAAG §§ 4.1.3, 
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4.1.6; Regents of Mercersburg Coll. v. Republic Franklin Ins. 
Co., 458 F.3d 159, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2006).  The ADAAG also 
recognizes another category of construction, ―addition,‖ 
though it treats additions largely as alterations.  ADAAG 
§ 4.1.5.  Generally, the ADA is more onerous on new 
construction projects than it is on alterations. 
 The District Court treated the Station renovations as an 
alteration but recognized that they ―may also qualify as new 
construction and/or addition.‖  hip II, 2011 WL 3957532, at 
*3.  On appeal, Plaintiffs urge application of the new-
construction rules, arguing that the ―headhouse‖ is an entirely 
new structure.  We reject this argument for two reasons.  
First, Plaintiffs‘ notice of appeal unambiguously specifies 
only the District Court‘s dismissal order, and not its summary 
judgment.  See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (―The notice of 
appeal must . . . designate the judgment, order, or part thereof 
being appealed . . . .‖).  In fact, the notice of appeal indicates 
it appeals the dismissal order only ―insofar as the order 
dismisses with prejudice the New Jersey state law claims 
raised in the Complaint.‖  (JA 5.)  Although there are 
circumstances under which we may review an order not 
specified in the notice of appeal, none is present in this 
appeal.  See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 
184 (3d Cir. 2010).  While we have jurisdiction to review the 
summary judgment because the Authority has appealed that 
order, we will not entertain Plaintiffs‘ challenge to an order 
from which they failed to appeal. 
 Second, we think the District Court‘s characterization 
of the construction project as an alteration was sound.  The 
regulations clearly distinguish between new construction and 
alterations, and because the obligations of the builder under 
each scheme are different, a given construction project must 
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be classified as one or the other.  An alteration is ―a change to 
an existing facility, including, but not limited to, remodeling, 
renovation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, historic restoration, 
changes or rearrangement in structural parts or elements, and 
changes or rearrangement in the plan configuration of walls 
and full-height partitions.‖  49 C.F.R. § 37.3.  The Grove 
Street Station project plainly falls under this definition, and it 
would be a stretch to claim that the Station, which existed in 
substantially the same form and for the same purpose prior to 
the renovation, is a new facility.  Moreover, the modifications 
clearly exceeded the scope of the definitional exclusions from 
―alteration,‖ such as ―[n]ormal maintenance, reroofing, 
painting or wallpapering,‖ because ―they affect[ed] the 
usability of the building or facility.‖  Id.  Accordingly, in this 
case we will apply only the ADA provisions applicable to 
alterations. 
 As noted, this case comes to us on the appeal of an 
order resolving cross-motions for summary judgment.  
―When reviewing a district court‘s summary judgment 
decision in an ADA case, we exercise plenary review, 
applying the same standard as the district court.‖  Sulima, 602 
F.3d at 184 (citing Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 
F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006)).  ―Summary judgment is 
appropriate if, viewing the record in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.‖  Id.; accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In 
considering Plaintiffs‘ and the Authority‘s motions, we must 
―construe[] facts and draw[] inferences in favor of the party 
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against whom the motion under consideration is made.‖1  J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
III 
 The touchstone of our analysis in this appeal is the 
Authority‘s obligation—triggered because it altered the 
Station—to make the Station accessible ―to the maximum 
extent feasible.‖  This requirement appears in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12147(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 37.43(a)(1), as well as in the 
―technical infeasibility‖ guideline, ADAAG § 4.1.6(1)(j), 
which is discussed in greater detail below. 
As used in this section, the phrase to the 
maximum extent feasible applies to the 
occasional case where the nature of an existing 
facility makes it impossible to comply fully 
with applicable accessibility standards through 
a planned alteration. In these circumstances, the 
entity shall provide the maximum physical 
accessibility feasible.  Any altered features of 
                                                 
 
1
 We have appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of 
a motion for summary judgment where a cross-motion has 
been granted.  Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 
501 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2008); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District 
Court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1343, and 1367. 
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the facility or portion of the facility that can be 
made accessible shall be made accessible. If 
providing accessibility to certain individuals 
with disabilities (e.g., those who use 
wheelchairs) would not be feasible, the facility 
shall be made accessible to individuals with 
other types of disabilities (e.g., those who use 
crutches, those who have impaired vision or 
hearing, or those who have other impairments). 
49 C.F.R. § 37.43(b).  Where we discuss ―feasibility‖ in this 
opinion, we do so only for the sake of expedience, 
recognizing that the actual standard—―to the maximum extent 
feasible‖—is much more demanding. 
 Having discerned the appropriate regulatory 
framework that governs this appeal, we turn to the substantive 
disputes.  The Authority proffers five reasons why it is 
entitled to summary judgment or, alternatively, summary 
judgment was wrongly entered for Plaintiffs.  Two of these 
arguments—that the ADA did not require the Authority to 
make the platform accessible because it was not an ―altered 
portion[]‖ of the facility, 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a), and that the 
Authority was excused from making ADA-compliant 
modifications because the cost of those changes would have 
been disproportionate, 49 C.F.R. § 37.43(e)–(f)—were not 
preserved in the District Court, so we will not consider them 
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here.
2
  Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 
2011).  That leaves three of the Authority‘s arguments for us 
to resolve: first, the accessibility modifications ordered by the 
District Court could not have been accomplished because 
they would require the acquisition of subterranean property 
rights currently owned by Jersey City; second, the ordered 
modifications would have been ―technically infeasible‖ under 
ADAAG § 4.1.6(1)(j), or, in the alternative, there are triable 
factual disputes regarding technical infeasibility; and third, 
the ordered modifications would not have been feasible 
because, if implemented, the Station might not have complied 
with National Fire Protection Association Standard 130 
(NFPA 130), a fire-safety code the Authority has adopted.  
We hold that neither side is entitled to summary judgment on 
these issues. 
                                                 
 
2
 We note that were we to exercise our discretion to 
reach these unpreserved arguments, we would be unlikely to 
find either persuasive.  Even the most cursory glance at the 
joint appendix‘s before-and-after photos of the platform-level 
tunnel and staircase indicates that the platform was part of the 
altered area, as those areas were clearly rehabilitated.  
Because the platform is part of the altered area, the ―path of 
travel‖ disproportionate-cost limitations, see 49 C.F.R. § 
37.43(e)(1), (f)(1); ADAAG § 4.1.6(2), do not apply.  
Additionally, the Authority has provided only estimates of the 
costs of implementing Schemes 4 or 5 now, and not how 
much those schemes would have cost if implemented during 
the period of construction, the latter being the relevant figures 
for the purposes of determining the Authority‘s obligations 
under the ADA. 
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 In considering the parties‘ arguments under the ADA, 
it is important to bear in mind that the ADA‘s obligations are 
triggered at the time the construction is undertaken, not after 
it has been completed and litigation has commenced.  See 
Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 375 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(describing the ADA-compliance inquiry as ―backward-
looking‖).  Consequently, in assessing whether the Authority 
has violated the ADA, we evaluate the circumstances as of 
the time of construction.  Questions of the feasibility of a 
proposed ADA-compliant modification, then, are directed not 
toward whether it would be feasible to execute the 
modification today, but rather whether it would have been 
feasible between 2002 and 2005.  The District Court did not 
address this question, but, rather, chose from the options for 
reconstructing the station that were presented as ―feasible 
after the fact.‖  We cannot endorse this approach, and, 
accordingly, will remand for consideration of ―feasibility‖ 
anew, as of the time of construction.  The parties present us 
with numerous arguments as to why it would or would not 
have been feasible to make Grove Street Station ADA-
accessible as part of the project at that time by installing an 
elevator to the platform level.  These arguments were 
addressed to (and in some instances, ruled upon by) the 
District Court as part of the summary judgment motion 
proceedings.  We will proceed to consider them. 
A 
 The Authority‘s first preserved argument is that the 
ADA does not and cannot mandate a public transit authority 
to purchase subterranean property rights held by another 
party, which it would be required to do under Schemes 4 and 
5.  It frames this argument under ADAAG § 4.1.6(1)(j), 
which states that ―if compliance with [the alteration 
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guideline] is technically infeasible, the alteration shall 
provide accessibility to the maximum extent feasible,‖ and 
defines ―technically infeasible‖ to mean, in relevant part, that 
―other existing physical or site constraints prohibit 
modification or addition of elements, spaces, or features 
which are in full and strict compliance with the minimum 
requirements for new construction and which are necessary to 
provide accessibility.‖  ADAAG § 4.1.6(1)(j).  We agree with 
the parties that the Authority bears the burden of proving 
technical infeasibility, as § 4.1.6(1)(j) acts as a kind of 
affirmative defense to otherwise applicable ADA compliance 
requirements.  Cf. Roberts, 542 F.3d at 370–71 (discussing 
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d 
Cir. 1995)) (holding in a Title III ADA case that the plaintiff 
need only ―mak[e] a facially plausible demonstration that the 
modification is an alteration‖ before the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show it is not an alteration); Turner, 440 F.3d at 
614 (observing that a disabled employee must make a prima 
facie showing that a proposed accommodation is possible 
before the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the 
accommodation is unreasonable or unduly burdensome). 
 In Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (DIA v. SEPTA), 635 
F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2011), we considered a similar issue 
regarding whether a district court can order ADA compliance 
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant does not presently 
possess property rights necessary to make the ordered 
modifications.  In that case, DIA sued SEPTA and the City of 
Philadelphia over accessibility barriers at two subway access 
points, the 15th Street Courtyard and City Hall Courtyard.  Id. 
at 91.  Early in the litigation, the city and DIA reached a 
settlement in which the city agreed to allow SEPTA to build 
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an elevator on its property at the 15th Street Courtyard and 
was dismissed from the suit as a result.  Id.  We affirmed the 
district court‘s order that SEPTA make both courtyards 
accessible.  Id. at 97.  Because compliance at the City Hall 
Courtyard also required use of the city‘s property, SEPTA 
argued that the Court could not order modification of that site 
without rejoining the city in the suit.  Id.  Ultimately rejecting 
SEPTA‘s argument for the necessity of joinder pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, we reasoned that because 
the city had already settled with DIA with respect to the other 
location, the city ―must [have] be[en] aware of DIA‘s current 
position,‖ and that the fact that the issue had not yet arisen in 
the lower court meant it did not pose a significant hurdle to 
relief.  Id. at 98.  The majority of the panel concluded that 
―SEPTA [would] have to work with the City in complying 
with [its] decision, something the City ha[d] already agreed to 
do with respect to the 15th Street Courtyard.‖  Id. 
Of course here, unlike DIA, we have less of a clear 
indication that Jersey City is willing to cooperate with the 
Authority in making the station accessible.  Though Plaintiffs 
have presented evidence that the mayor has indicated that the 
City could allow access to the property, it is the City Council 
that must vote on any such matter.  Because we lack any 
similar indication from the City Council, we cannot assume 
that the Authority will be able to acquire the land rights it 
needs to implement Scheme 4 or 5.  Accordingly, summary 
judgment need not be entered for the Authority, either. 
As we see it, the mere fact that the Authority would 
now have to acquire land from a third-party is not sufficient 
to render the proposed accommodations per se infeasible.  
Indeed, in considering feasibility, as we must, as of the time 
of the original construction, the Authority may have been able 
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to negotiate for the use or ownership of the relevant land in 
the manner it had to facilitate construction of the headhouse 
for the east entrance.  In light of the mayor‘s letter to the 
Plaintiffs, this may still be the case.  There is, however, an 
open factual question as to whether the relief ordered by the 
District Court would now be ineffective because the City 
Council might refuse to negotiate a subterranean easement or 
sale to the Authority.  On this point, we remand for further 
development of the record. 
While it may be the case that joinder of the City 
becomes appropriate, as we see it, this issue can just as easily 
be resolved by introducing evidence of the City Council‘s 
intent to approve or deny the Authority‘s use or acquisition of 
the land required under Schemes 4 and 5.  Until the Authority 
has demonstrated that the Council will not allow it to use the 
land, we cannot conclude that the proposed accommodations 
are infeasible within the meaning of the ADA. 
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B 
 The next two issues focus on the consequences of 
implementing Schemes 4 and 5. Because the appropriate 
inquiry under the ADA is backward-looking, and because 
Schemes 4 and 5 have been presented as prospective 
possibilities, those schemes may not be identical to those 
asserted by Plaintiffs at trial on remand.  However, we 
recognize that the proposed modifications that might have 
been feasible between 2002 and 2005 may closely resemble 
the concept behind Schemes 4 and 5—LULA elevators to the 
platform—and therefore we proceed to address the feasibility 
concerns raised by the parties with respect to those schemes. 
 The parties dispute whether both of the schemes found 
feasible by the District Court require the removal of a load-
bearing part of the Station or are otherwise technically 
infeasible.  In addition to the definition set forth above, 
technical infeasibility exists where the modification ―has little 
likelihood of being accomplished because existing structural 
conditions would require removing or altering a load-bearing 
member which is an essential part of the structural frame.‖  
ADAAG § 4.1.6(1)(j).  ―The structural frame shall be 
considered to be the columns and the girders, beams, trusses 
and spandrels having direct connections to the columns and 
all other members which are essential to the stability of the 
building as a whole.‖  ADAAG § 3.5; see Americans With 
Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for 
Buildings and Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408, 35,428 (July 
26, 1991) (responding to a comment on the proposed 
guidelines by opining that the ―structural frame‖ definition 
does ―not include wood or metal studs or joists used in light-
frame construction of interior walls and floors‖).  As noted, 
technical infeasibility also encompasses situations where 
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―other existing physical or site constraints prohibit 
modification.‖ 
 The parties did not develop a good factual record on 
this issue below.  The Authority argues that ―a roof structure‖ 
would need to be removed in Scheme 4 and avers there were 
―[f]actual conflicts‖ over the load-bearing-member issue in 
the District Court.  Authority Br. 23–24.  The Authority‘s 
reply brief provides further citations to record evidence that 
suggests, but stops short of explicitly stating, that in order to 
implement Schemes 4 or 5 the Station‘s ―structural conditions 
would require removing or altering a load-bearing member 
which is an essential part of the structural frame.‖  See 
Authority Reply Br. 16–18 (citing JA 415, 810, 1601–02).  
To offer just one example, the Authority‘s feasibility report 
on Plaintiffs‘ proposed Schemes 4 and 5 notes that those 
schemes ―[m]ay require structural modifications to ‗pressure 
slab‘ below stair at station entrance.‖  (JA 1601–02.)  The 
Authority claims this ―pressure slab‖ is a load-bearing 
member falling within the technical infeasibility exception. 
 By contrast, Plaintiffs assert there is no record 
evidence that the removal of a load-bearing member would be 
necessary under either scheme and they present an expert who 
opines that Schemes 4 and 5 are feasible.  The Authority 
counters that Plaintiffs‘ expert does not understand the 
meaning of technical infeasibility. 
 The lack of clarity in the record indicates there is a 
genuine dispute of material fact over whether a load-bearing 
member would need to be removed to make the east side 
accessible, whether Schemes 4 and 5 are otherwise 
technically infeasible, and whether they would have been 
infeasible had they been incorporated into the original 
 18 
 
construction plans.  Therefore, these issues must be submitted 
for trial. 
C 
 Finally, the Authority contends that because Schemes 
4 and 5 do not pass scrutiny under a fire-safety standard 
(NFPA 130), their implementation would not be ―feasible‖ 
under the ADA.  NFPA 130, titled ―Standard for Fixed 
Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems,‖ contains 
numerous recommendations for designing rail systems to 
minimize risks associated with fire.  The Authority highlights 
two of these recommendations as relevant to Schemes 4 and 
5.  First, as the District Court put it, ―a bidirectional corridor 
must be at least 44 inches wide to ensure safe ingress and 
egress.‖  hip II, 2011 WL 3957532, at *4.  Second, according 
to the Authority, evacuation must be possible ―from the most 
remote point on the platform to a point of safety in six 
minutes or less.‖  Authority Br. 25.  The District Court held 
that the corridor width in Schemes 4 and 5 exceeded the 44-
inch minimum but the Court did not address the egress time 
restriction. 
 The parties disagree about the deference owed to 
NFPA 130 under the ADA‘s framework.  Plaintiffs 
characterize it as a safety standard that the Authority 
voluntarily implements, which cannot trump the mandatory 
ADA.  The Authority suggests NFPA 130 implementation is 
necessary under federal transportation regulations that 
mandate compliance with fire-safety standards.  For its part, 
the ADA does not address where, if at all, safety standards fit 
within its regulatory framework. 
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 We believe the ―maximum extent feasible‖ test can 
account for such safety standards.  ―[T]he phrase to the 
maximum extent feasible applies to the occasional case where 
the nature of an existing facility makes it impossible to 
comply fully with applicable accessibility standards through a 
planned alteration.‖  49 C.F.R. § 37.43(b) (emphasis added); 
see 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,428 (―[E]xisting physical or site 
constraints prohibiting full and strict compliance . . . can 
result from legitimate legal requirements (e.g., a right of way 
agreement preventing construction of a ramp in front of a 
building).‖).  The ability to comply with safety standards 
relates to ―the nature of an existing facility.‖  We leave it to 
the District Court to determine in the first instance the weight 
to be accorded to these safety standards.  Nevertheless, we 
think it likely that where compliance with a safety standard is 
required by law, a modification that would not comply with 
that safety standard is not ―feasible.‖  Even where the 
standard is not legally mandated, if it is uniformly 
implemented by the agency under ADA scrutiny and widely 
used by other transit agencies, a district court should be 
reluctant to order the agency to deviate from it. 
 We cannot discern the significance of NFPA 130 from 
the record before us, in large part because of the manner in 
which the issue was presented by the Authority to the District 
Court.  The Authority did not raise NFPA 130 until after the 
Court heard argument on the motions for summary judgment 
(even if it did raise evacuation concerns more broadly), and 
the expert affidavits it submitted generically reference exit 
time but do not squarely address the six-minute limitation.  
Highly technical arguments require specificity in 
presentation, and while we cannot say that the Authority 
failed to raise this argument before the District Court, we 
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understand why the District Court believed the corridor-width 
issue to be the only one presented by NFPA 130.  At the same 
time, Plaintiffs‘ expert was unfamiliar with NFPA 130 and 
offered no opinion on the Station‘s egress capacity.  On this 
record, both the nature of the NFPA 130 requirement and 
whether Schemes 4 or 5 satisfy it are unclear and may be 
addressed by the District Court on remand. 
 In sum, there are three triable issues of fact related to 
the feasibility of Schemes 4 and 5 under § 12147(a) or 
§ 4.1.6(1)(j): the acquisition of property rights from Jersey 
City; the technical infeasibility of making Grove Street 
Station ADA-accessible, and, in particular, whether either 
requires removing or altering a load-bearing member; and the 
compliance (and necessity of compliance) of those Schemes 
with NFPA 130.  Some of these issues may be resolved prior 
to submission of the case to the jury as described more fully 
above. 
IV 
 Plaintiffs‘ cross-appeal concerns the District Court‘s 
dismissal of their state-law claims on the basis that the 
application of state law to an agency operating under an 
interstate compact is permissible only if provided for in the 
compact.  Because the Authority‘s compact does not so 
provide, we will affirm. 
 ―A bi-state entity, created by compact, is ‗not subject 
to the unilateral control of any one of the States that compose 
the federal system.‘‖  Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 
542 v. Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n, 311 F.3d 273, 
281 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson 
Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 42 (1994)).  This is so because interstate 
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compacts entered into with congressional consent under the 
Compact Clause function as a ―surrender[] [of] a portion of 
their sovereignty‖ to an ―‗independently functioning part[] of 
a regional polity and of a national union.‘‖  Id. at 276 
(quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 40).  ―Such a surrender of state 
sovereignty should be treated with great care, and the 
Supreme Court has stated that courts should not find a 
surrender unless it has been ‗expressed in terms too plain to 
be mistaken.‘‖  Id. (quoting Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 
66 U.S. 436, 446 (1861)).  ―Our role in interpreting the 
Compact is, therefore, to effectuate the clear intent of both 
sovereign states, not to rewrite their agreement or order relief 
inconsistent with its express terms.‖  Id. (citing Texas v. New 
Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564–65 (1983)). 
 In Delaware River, we considered a compact that did 
not contain the ―concurred in‖ language that is frequently 
found in interstate compacts to allow a state to modify a 
compact with legislation, provided its partner state passes 
similar legislation.  Id.  Finding the absence of that language 
significant, we nonetheless reviewed various approaches 
taken by federal and state courts interpreting ―concurred in‖ 
clauses in compacts.  Some courts require an express 
statement of intent by both state legislatures to modify the 
compact, and other courts permit ―complementary or parallel‖ 
actions of two state legislatures to imply the intent to modify 
the compact.  Id. at 276–79.  Ultimately we applied the 
―express intent standard‖ and found there was no evidence of 
intent by the states ―to amend the Compact or apply their 
collective bargaining laws to the‖ bi-state entity.  Id. at 280. 
 The compact between New York and New Jersey that 
created the Authority provides that ―[t]he port authority shall 
have such additional powers and duties as may hereafter be 
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delegated to or imposed upon it from time to time by the 
action of the legislature of either state concurred in by the 
legislature of the other.‖  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-8 (emphasis 
added) (codifying the compact); N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6408 
(same); accord N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-4; N.Y. Unconsol. Law 
§ 6404.  However, there is no dispute that the New Jersey 
laws relied upon by Plaintiffs do not purport to regulate the 
Authority, nor do Plaintiffs contend that there is an implied 
agreement based on parallel legislation to amend the compact. 
 Instead, relying on New York case law, Plaintiffs urge 
the panel to distinguish between ―internal operations‖ and 
―external conduct‖ of the Authority in applying these 
compact principles.  See Agesen v. Catherwood, 260 N.E.2d 
525, 526–27 (N.Y. 1970); see also Dezaio v. Port Auth. of 
N.Y. & N.J., 205 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing 
Agesen but declining to apply New York state employment 
discrimination laws to the Authority, implicitly assuming that 
employment matters relate to the internal operation of the 
Authority).  Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that while a state 
cannot regulate the Authority‘s internal operations on its own, 
it can regulate the external conduct of the agency.  Plaintiffs 
define external conduct as actions relating to ―health and 
safety.‖  See Agesen, 260 N.E.2d at 526–27. 
 There is no basis in Third Circuit precedent for the 
internal-external distinction, nor would such a distinction 
necessarily be well-founded.
3
  But we need not consider the 
                                                 
 
3
 In Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass’n, Inc. v. City of 
Camden (EPVA), 545 A.2d 127 (N.J. 1988), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court declined to adopt the internal-external 
distinction because ―[o]nly when the compact itself 
recognizes the jurisdiction of the compact states may it be 
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matter, for even if such a distinction were adopted, the 
decision of whether to comply with an anti-discrimination 
statute in constructing a facility is best described as an 
―internal operation‖ because the decision does not relate to 
anything external to the Authority or to health or safety.  The 
Authority‘s decisions on station construction do not threaten 
physical harm to New Jersey‘s citizens.  Consequently, just as 
the Dezaio Court found that New York employment 
discrimination laws could not be applied to the Authority, so 
too is New Jersey barred from applying its civil rights and 
construction code statutes to the Authority.  Cf. Am. Honda 
Fin. Corp. v. One 2008 Honda Pilot, 878 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (suggesting that the Authority‘s claimed 
vehicular lien was an external matter not protected by its 
claim to autonomy but avoiding that holding because the 
Authority conceded the applicability of the state statute). 
                                                                                                             
subject to single-state jurisdiction.‖  Id. at 132.  Plaintiffs 
claim that Delaware River is fundamentally inconsistent with 
this case, but the Delaware River Court, while rejecting 
EPVA‘s adoption of the implicit ―complementary or parallel 
test,‖ cited with approval EPVA‘s holding that an express 
statement attempting to regulate a bi-state entity was 
insufficient to modify a compact ―without ‗some showing of 
agreement by both states to the enforcement of the [state 
law].‘‖  311 F.3d at 280–81 (quoting EPVA, 545 A.2d at 133–
34).  Accordingly, even though we do not recognize implicit 
modifications of an interstate compact as the New Jersey 
Supreme Court might, both jurisdictions require evidence of 
mutual intent to alter a compact and regulate the bi-state 
agency, regardless of whether the action taken by the agency 
is ―external‖ or ―internal.‖ 
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 Plaintiffs also contend that ―the Compact contains no 
express surrender of state sovereignty regarding external 
relations, including, among other things, barrier-free 
construction codes and related civil rights statutes,‖ the 
subjects of Plaintiffs‘ state-law claims, meaning the Authority 
lacks the power to avoid the reach of these New Jersey laws.  
Plaintiffs Br. 34.  This argument misapprehends the notion of 
sovereignty surrender discussed in Hess and Delaware River.  
While a court must be hesitant to find a surrender of 
sovereignty where it is ambiguous, here there is no question 
the states intended to create the Authority, and such surrender 
has already been recognized by numerous courts, including 
the United States Supreme Court in Hess.  By expressly 
creating the bi-state entity, New York and New Jersey 
relinquished all control over the Authority unless otherwise 
stated in the compact.  Under Delaware River, that 
autonomous entity cannot be unilaterally regulated by New 
Jersey. 
V 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the summary 
judgment of the District Court, we will affirm its dismissal of 
the state-law claims, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
